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--------------------------------------------------------ABSTRACT----------------------------------------------------------- 
Intelligent Vehicles System (IVS) supports a wide variety of Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) 
services such as vehicle visibility detection.  In implementing this service, the message authentication is a vital 
design parameter that protects victim vehicles from being tricked into accepting false messages as legitimate 
ones and make a false decision based on the incoming message. However, implementing message authentication 
service is too expensive especially if vehicles, initially, don’t trust each others or there is no certificate of 
authority in place.   
In this research, we investigate the use of the Basic Safety Message (BSM) behavior over time as a metric to 
allow a receiving vehicle to anticipate at what distance it will continue to receive BSMs from within-range 
vehicles. Therefore, the victim vehicle would reject the BSM messages that fall outside its acceptance window.   
Simulation experiments are setup to study the realistic behavior of the BSM messages in different environment 
characteristics including changing the vehicle size, number of road lanes and vehicle speed.   Research findings 
suggested that the lightweight message authentication can assist vehicles in estimating the duration for a trusted 
relationship among those that are located within range of each others. 
Keywords - ITS, DSRC, message authentication, Visibility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a connected vehicle system, Basic Safety Message (BSM) is used to convey road safety messages on US high 
ways [1].  Connected vehicles are communicating using either Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) or Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure communication architecture.  V2V communications aims to provide each vehicle with 360-degree 
situational awareness of nearby vehicles, and by complementing onboard sensors in detecting possible crash 
scenarios [3].  Moreover, in V2V or V2I architecture, vehicles use Dedicated Short Range Communications 
(DSRC) transmissions to share Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) safety information services such as 
road conditions or vehicle’s location, weight, size or its heading direction, probability of vehicle collision with 
neighboring vehicles.  Authors in [1], indicated that a recent report issued by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration United States (NHTSA) shows that implementing just two V2V safety applications 
(Intersection Movement Assist (IMA) and Left Turn Assist (LTA)) will potentially prevent 25,000 to 592,000 
crashes, save 49 to 1,083 lives, avoid 11,000 to 270,000 maximum abbreviated injuries, and minimize 31,000 to 
728,000 property damage.   Research efforts to better use the BSM message in the dissemination process of 
safety messages presented in the work presented by authors in [1] 
Authors in [1], developed a Tractor-Trailer Basic Safety Message (TT-BSM) extensions to correctly represent 
the location of the articulated vehicles in V2X communications.  The authors’ approach aims to reduce the 
potential for false safety warnings messages in the DSRC-based systems.  Authors indicated that the additional 
data sent in the BSM will have a minor effect on the over-the-air data traffic or the channel utilization efficiency 
because the number tractor-trailer vehicles is fairly a small fraction of the overall vehicles on the road.   
However, attacking and altering the safety messages sent in the V2V environment becomes possible due to the 
fact that vehicles have various penetration inputs. Consequently, this will lead to defeat the purpose of 
implementing a V2V communication to promote awareness and safety on our roads.  
Vehicle attack surface represents all the possible ways to attack a victim vehicle. The target could be the 
vehicle’s On Board Unit (OBU) or the entire vehicle system. The vehicle has multiple entry points to 
synchronize the attack that is represented by the system’s possible weaknesses.  In a V2V or V2I network 
architecture, an attacker will consider all the possible ways to inject malicious or fake data into the vehicle 
system via any of its sensors such as RADAR, LIDAR, ultrasound or the DSRC sensor such as shown in Fig. 1.   
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Furthermore, the attacker constructs a dynamic threat model to study and track the victim vehicle to learn about 
how these sensors communicate and at what time they are active.  Then, choosing the location, entry point and 
the right time to inject the malicious data becomes a critical factor to execute the hacking activity [2]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. V2V Attack Scenario 
 
Efforts made research and industry communities to protect the BSM messages over the air.   In [3], authors 
introduced an On-board Unit (OBU) VBSS solution, which generates a short-term certificate and signs Basic 
Safety Messages (BSM) to preserve privacy and enhance security.   In this work, authors developed their 
solution based on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) where vehicles create groups. Each group will have its 
public and private keys, and a vehicle will sign a message using its group’s private key.  Moreover, authors 
encouraged research community to continue conducting further research to validate the proposed vehicle-based 
approach in V2V credential management. 
 
In this research, we are investigating another Vehicle-Based Security System (VBSS) for a V2V system to 
provide security and privacy via developing a lightweight message authentication framework solution. The 
proposed framework allows a victim vehicle to discriminate against spoofed BSM messages.  When building this 
framework, several design goals were considered and special efforts were made to: 
- Provide on a vehicle infrastructure-less solution.  
- Rely on a Certificate Authority-less solution.  Therefore, no need to the use of certificate authority body 
hosted on a fixed Radio Service Unit (RSU). 
- Predict the authentication session duration for how long the two vehicles will build their trust relationship via 
message authentication.   
The proposed solution’s framework consists of two phases such as described below:  
 
Phase-I: 
 In this phase, the authentication session lifetime is estimated by having two vehicles predicting a Visibility 
Time Window (VTW) factor based on the timing and the sequence of the BSM messages and the vehicle’s 
speed.   So, essentially the VTW window defines the duration for the authentication session.  Simulation 
experiments will be conducted to determine the VTW in different simulation environments. Messages arrived 
outside the VTW may be ignored because they may redundant or malicious. 
 
Phase-II:   Monitoring the consistency of a 
 In this phase, the sending vehicle will calculate a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and the receiving 
vehicle will verify this code over the duration of the VTW window such as follows:   
a. At the sending vehicle, the MAC value is calculated based on hashing the vehicle VIN number, location and 
size. Then the sending vehicle sends out its BSM message along with the calculated MAC value.  
b. At the receiving vehicle, the OBU verifies the BSM message integrity using the incoming MAC value as well 
as calculating a hash value such as follows: 
i. Use the camera sensor to capture a picture for the sending vehicle, 
ii. Use the picture estimation algorithm in [4] to estimate the vehicle’s size, 
iii. Hash the sending vehicle’s estimated size from step (ii), VIN number, location, 
iv. Compare the value calculated in above in (iii) with the incoming hash value and 
v. If the two hash values match, this means that the message is coming from a trusted source; otherwise, it will be 
disregarded and dropped.  
Since calculating the VTW window is cornerstone for this solution framework, we will focus on implementing 
the framework’s first phase in this paper.   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides an overview on the BSM message format, Section 3 describes how the simulation experiments are 
designed and executed.  Sections 4 and 5 conclude the paper and outline the future work. 
 
 
Attacker’s 
Malicious 
Warning 
Message Attack 
Vehicle 
Victim 
Vehicle 
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II. BASIC SAFETY MESSAGE (BSM) 
By default, BSMs are periodically broadcasted to nearby vehicles carrying the safety messages. However, user 
custom information can be added to the BSM messages using custom fields.  An example for custom info is a 
pull-over BSM message sent to a police vehicle to a violating vehicle.  Messages that carry such sensitive info 
should be verified to ensure its legitimacy while protecting the identity of the driver or vehicle [3].    
According to the SAE J2735 DSRC definition, BSM message consists of data elements (DEs) and data frames 
(DFs). The data frame consists of one or more data elements or other data frames.  Furthermore, the BSM 
message consists of two sections such as shown in table 1. The first section is a required section of any BSM 
message and is known as Basic Vehicle State with a size of 39 Bytes.  The second section of the BSM is optional 
and contains the Vehicle Safety Extensions and the Vehicle Status data frames.  In general, vehicles periodically 
broadcast the first section of the BSM message only.  However, in some events such as emergency braking, the 
BSM message can be further described by setting the corresponding event flag in the second part of the BSM, 
[1]. 
 
Table 1: Basic Safety Message (BSM) 
BSM Data Item  Sequence  BSM 
Part  
Type  Bytes  
Message ID  I Data Element 1 
Message Count  I Data Element 1 
Temporary ID  I Data Element 4 
 Time  I Data Element 2 
Latitude  
PositionLocal3D 
I Data Element 4 
Longitude I Data Element 4 
Elevation I Data Element 2 
Positioning Accuracy I Data Frame 4 
Transmission & Speed  
Motion 
I Data Frame 2 
Heading I Data Element 2 
Steering Wheel Angle I Data Element 1 
Accelerations I Data Frame 7 
Brake System Status Control I Data Frame 2 
Vehicle Size Vehicle Basics I Data Frame 3 
 
To keep track of the number of BSM messages sent out over time, the BSM message format contains a field 
called MsgCount.  It is simply a number that serves the same purpose as sequence numbers in traditional 
networking protocols. Fig. 2 is developed by a 3D Simulink model.  It displays the progression of the MsgCount 
field of two transmitting vehicles over time (one vehicle is pink, the other is yellow).   Fig. 2 shows that two cars 
are traveling together from the right of the screen to the left, while a third one is traveling on the opposite 
direction is the receiving vehicle. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  MsgCount Field Progression over Time for Two BSM Messages   
 
III.   EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
We carried out multiple simulation experiments to calculate the visibility time between two testing vehicles. The 
visibility time represents the amount of time during which the transmitting vehicle was within the receiving 
vehicle's range.  In the next sections, we’ll introduce our simulation environment implemented by PreScan and 
the details of the conducted experiments to calculate the visibility time in different settings. 
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3.1 Prescan Simulation Engine 
PreScan is a simulation development environment that is used to simulate realistic driving conditions and allow 
for testing users’ algorithms and ADAS services in realistic simulation environment.   It supports 
communications using various sensor technologies such as built-in vehicle camera, LIDAR, RADAR, and GPS 
in V2V and V2I architecture. PreScan supports three design paradigms: model-based controller design (MIL), 
real-time tests with software-in-the-loop (SIL) and hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) systems [4 and 5]. PreScan 
provides a GUI that enables us to build a simulation scenario and model sensors, while the Simulink and 
MATLAB interface allows us to add a control system to define the simulation building blocks to test the ADAS 
application or the user algorithm. There are four steps to build and run a simulation scenario such as described 
below and in Fig. 3. 
a. Building the simulation scenario 
A dedicated GUI is used to build and modify traffic scenarios using an existing database of road sections, trees, 
buildings, traffic signs, different vehicles such as cars, trucks and various weather conditions such as rain, snow 
and fog. 
b. Modeling sensors 
Various types of sensors such as radar, laser, camera, ultrasound, infrared, GPS and antennas for vehicle-to-X 
(V2X) communication can be added with various parameters to adjust to fit the simulation scenario. 
c. Adding control system 
A Matlab/Simulink interface enables us to control the vehicle movement algorithm as well as sensor fusion and 
adding any user custom module to perform a mathematical operation such as calculating the inter-vehicle 
distance in a simulation environment and exporting collected data to output files.   
d. Running the simulation experiment 
A 3D visualization viewer allows users to monitor the progress of the simulation experiment as well as analyze 
the obtained results. 
 
 
Figure 3. PreScan Simulation Engine Life Cycle [5] 
 
3.2 Building Simulation Experiments 
PreScan has been chosen to implement the simulation environment because it supports DSRC communications. 
We setup and ran PreScan and Simulink simulation experiments to determine the visibility time between two 
testing vehicles using different scenarios such as described in table 2, 3, 4 and 5: 
 
Table 2: Control Experiment Parameters 
Experiment1: Control Experiment Parameters 
Vehicle Size Vehicle Speed Vehicle Trajectory 
Sending Vehicle Receiving Vehicle Sending 
Vehicle (m/s) 
Receiving 
Vehicle (m/s) 
Road 
Length(m) 
Number of 
Lanes 
Sedan - Citreon C3 - 
Travels along westernmost 
northbound lane, turns left 
at intersection 
Sedan - BMW Z3 - Travels 
along southernmost 
eastbound lane, turns left at 
intersection 
15 15 120 2 opposite 
lanes 
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Table 3: Truck Experiment Parameters 
Experiment 2: Truck Experiment Parameters 
Vehicle Size Vehicle Speed Vehicle Trajectory 
Sending Vehicle Receiving Vehicle Sending Vehicle 
(m/s) 
Receiving 
Vehicle (m/s) 
Road 
Length(m) 
Number of 
Lanes 
Truck/Nissan Cabstar - 
Travels along westernmost 
northbound lane, turns left at 
intersection 
 
Sedan - BMW Z3 Travels 
along southernmost 
eastbound lane, turns left at 
intersection 
 
15 15 120 2 opposite 
lanes 
 
Table 4: Five Lanes Experiment Parameters 
Experiment 3: Five Lanes Experiment Parameters 
Vehicle Size Vehicle Speed Vehicle Trajectory 
Sending Vehicle Receiving Vehicle Sending 
Vehicle (m/s) 
Receiving 
Vehicle (m/s) 
Road 
Length(m) 
Number of 
Lanes 
Sedan - Citreon C3 - Travels 
along westernmost northbound 
lane, turns left at intersection 
 
Sedan - BMW Z3 - Travels 
along southernmost 
eastbound lane, turns left at 
intersection 
 
15 15 120 5 opposite 
lanes 
 
Table 5: 25 Meter per Sec Speed Experiment Parameters 
Experiment 4: Twenty-Five MPS Experiment Parameters 
Vehicle Size Vehicle Speed Vehicle Trajectory 
Sending Vehicle Receiving Vehicle Sending Vehicle 
(m/s) 
Receiving 
Vehicle (m/s) 
Road 
Length(m) 
Number 
of Lanes 
Sedan - Citreon C3 - Travels 
along westernmost northbound 
lane, turns left at intersection  
Sedan - BMW Z3 - Travels 
along southernmost 
eastbound lane, turns left at 
intersection 
 
25 25 120 2 opposite 
lanes 
 
A snapshot from the real time simulation environment for each experiment is depicted in Fig 4.  
 
(a) Real Time View of the Simulation Environment For the 
Control Experiment 
 
(b) Real Time View of the Simulation Environment For 
the Truck Experiment 
 
(c) Real Time View of the Simulation Environment For the 
5 Lanes Experiment 
 
 
(d) Real Time View of the Simulation Environment For 
the 25 m/s Speed Experiment 
 
Figure 4. PreScan Simulation Environment 
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The data collected from the simulation experiments are synchronous across all experiments, which means that 
the time samples for all experiments match up to that of the control experiment without error. Simulation results 
obtained are summarized in table 6. 
 
Table 6: Simulation Results Summary 
Experiment Type First BSM Message  Time 
(Sec) 
Last BSM Message  Time 
(Sec) 
Visibility Time (Sec) 
Control Experiment (1) 2.2  5.90  3.75  
Truck Experiment (2) 2.2  5.95  3.80  
Five Lanes Experiment (3) 2.2  6.20  3.95  
25 MPS Speed Experiment (4) 1.80  4.25  2.45  
 
We have observed that, as long as the vehicles speed is the same, the visibility time is almost the same such as 
shown below: 
 Control experiment      (2.2 5.90: 3.75Sec),  
 Truck experiment         (2.25.95: 3.80Sec),  
 Five Lanes experiment (2.26.20: 3.95Sec),  
 25m/s experiment         (1.804.25: 2.45Sec).     
 
This means that the receiving vehicle is able to detect its peer vehicle at an average visibility time of 3.83 Sec.  
In other words, the two vehicles will be able to hold an active authenticated communications session for 3.83 Sec 
starting from receiving the first BSM message.  The only exception here is when the two vehicle are travelling 
with a high speed (25m/s), the visibility time = 2.45 Sec.    Therefore, the vehicle that is traveling at a higher 
speed (25 m/s) was detectable for less time and they are able to hold a shorter V2V communications session.  So, 
when vehicles travel at the same speed for instance at (15m/s), vehicles can predict for how far and for how long 
they will be engaged in an authenticated communication session.    Assume that before a target vehicle is being 
within range of an attack vehicle, the attack vehicle will know neither its distance from the victim vehicle nor its 
victim's receiving range.   Consequently, it will be very difficult for an attacker to successfully synchronize an 
attack to get a spoofed fake message through without any outside help because the target vehicle is sensitive not 
only to the contents of the BSM, but also to the behavior of the BSM's contents over time. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, authors focused on predicting the authentication session duration based on estimating the visibility 
time between 2 vehicles in a V2V vehicle communication scenario.  Authors introduced the visibility time 
window as a measure for the authentication session duration.  Authors conducted simulation experiments using 
PreScan to study measure the visibility time between two vehicles in a V2V environment. The effect of several 
driving environment conditions have been studied and analyzed such as vehicle size, speed, and number of road 
lanes.   
We found that it is fairly easy that vehicles can estimate how long their communication session can last for from 
receiving the first BSM message.  Any messages arrived outside the visibility time window may be ignored  
 
Future Work 
Authors would like to investigate the implementation and evaluation of the second phase of the proposed 
framework.   
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